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On 28 March 2004, US troops in Baghdad padlocked the door of Al Hawza, a popular Shiite 
newspaper. Paul Bremer, the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), had 
ordered the paper to be closed for allegedly inciting violence against coalition troops. It was 
asserted that continuing to allow the flow of inaccurate anti-American rumours was hindering 
the possibility of promoting peace and unity. The decision was taken against the advice of the 
CPA’s Media Development Director, Simon Haselock, and was met by angry cries of “where 
is democracy now”. The Vice Chairman of the Committee of Concerned Journalists argued 
that the move was a step backward, noting that, “it’s hard for me to see how the suppression 
of information, even false information, is going to help our cause”. 1  The Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq declared that, “punishing the paper will only increase the passion for those 
who speak out against the Americans”. 2  In July, Iraq’s interim Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, 
issued a decree allowing the paper to reopen, apparently to show his “absolute belief in the 
freedom of the press”. Himself a Shiite, this was seen by some as a way of currying favour 
with the radicals. If so, they were not impressed.3 Soon afterwards his own concerns about 
critical media coverage were highlighted when his government closed down the Iraq office of 
the well-known Arabic-language media organisation, Al-Jazeera. Allawi explained:  
We have asked an independent committee to monitor Al-Jazeera for 
the last four weeks... to see what kind of violence they are advocating, 
inciting hatred and problems and racia l tensions… This is a decision 
taken by the national security committee to protect the people of Iraq, 
in the interests of the Iraqi people.4  
 
These events are indicative of the complexities and competing interests that drive media5 
policy in environments affected by violent conflict, and they draw attention to a conundrum 
that is not unique to Iraq. Should media freedoms be an essential aspect of peace building, or 
does peace building necessitate the restriction of dissent – in other words, censorship? 
Particularly since the end of the Cold War, the ‘international community’ (i.e. the vague 
entity which is primarily made up of rich-country governments, Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGO’s), International Finance Institutions (IFI’s) and the United Nations  
(UN) system), has tended to stress accountable governance as a centrepiece of both peace-
building initiatives and programmes for social and economic development. There is, of 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘G.I.’s Padlock Baghdad Paper Accused of Lies’, The New York Times (29 March 2004), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/29/international/worldspecial/29PRES.html. 
2 Gettleman (2004). 
3 Tarek El-Tablawy, ‘Controversial Iraqi Newspaper Reopened’, Editor and Publisher (July 19, 2004), at 
http://www.editorandpublisher.com. 
4 ‘Iraq Orders Al-Jazeera Office in Baghdad to Close’, Agence France Presse  (August 8, 2004), at 
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0808-02.htm. 
5 When addressing issues of the media we are primarily referring to the local news media, and similarly when 
referring to media policy we are addressing strategies towards local media.  Such media is usually at the centre 
of debates regarding free expression and is often the most threatening form of media during times of peace 
building.  
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course, a great deal of rhetoric and hypocrisy in this.  Also as Simon Haselock has noted 
during his work in Iraq, “the ‘International Community’ is a multi-headed hydra and the 
heads are all looking at each other and all the time arguing amongst each other”.6 
Nevertheless, this liberal agenda has tended to drive media policy. An open media is seen as a 
‘good thing’, and has been promoted even in somewhat extreme circumstances, such as those 
that have prevailed in Afghanistan following the US-lead invasion. Here we ask if such a 
strategy is really appropriate.  
 
Establishing a political framework is vital to peace building, and the crucial underlying aspect 
of this is the issue of security. Peace requires the acceptance of certain hierarchies and the 
prevention of violence, based on some semblance of the rule of law. In such circumstances, a 
degree of censorship may be essential. When Rwandan President Paul Kagame publicly states 
that his country is not ready for an entirely free media environment, he has a point. Local 
media, most notoriously the government radio station Mille Collines, undoubtedly played a 
significant role in the genocide. In the aftermath of social upheaval, the crucial short-term 
issue is not how to promote freedom of speech but rather how controls on expressing dissent 
should be exercised. 
  
This paper begins by identifying and discussing the current prevailing liberal policy towards 
the media’s role in ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-building’.7 We will then proceed to assess 
whether this has been an effective or ineffective approach, and conclude by suggesting ways 
in which the debate can be reframed or expanded. In brief, we will argue that laissez-faire 
policies towards media development in societies that are in the process of resolving violent 
conflicts are unlikely to be the best option. While recognising that proposing censorship is 
problematic and controversial, we argue that there have to be restrictions on material that is 
divisive and inflammatory – although this inevitably raises questions of who should decide 
what is unacceptable and on what basis. 
 
 
The media, violent conflict and peace 
Despite a large and growing literature relating to peace initiatives, it is remarkable how the 
role of the media has often been ignored. The capability of the media to inflame hatreds and 
promote violence has been relatively well documented from early studies of the role of the 
radio in Nazi propaganda campaigns to the more recent examples of Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia.8 This literature has highlighted the need to prevent the media from being used to 
mobilise populations for mass slaughter, and various strategies for intervening have been 
proposed by international agencies, policy-makers and analysts for what has been termed 
                                                 
6 Simon Haselock, ‘Media, the Law and Peace building: From Bosnia and Kosovo to Iraq’, Alistair Berkley 
Memorial Lecture, London School of Economics (21 May 2004), at 
http://www.crisisstates.com/News/berkley.htm. 
7 By the term media we are essentially referring to news media, although the points made also relate to other 
forms of communication. Peacemaking and peace building are terms that are widely used but rarely defined.  We 
take peacemaking to mean the pushing forward of the project of peace sometimes through military intervention 
and sometimes through negotiation.  Peace building will often involve peacemaking, but also suggests the 
establishing of institutions that will allow peace to become self-sustaining.  
8 See, for example, Mark Thompson, Forging War: the Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina , 
London: Article 19, 1994; and the various contributions to Tim Allen & Jean Seaton (eds), The Media of 
Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, London: Zed Books, 1999. 
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‘information intervention’.9 Nevertheless, ways in which a media environment can be either 
constructed or regulated to promote peace have yet to be sufficiently explored.10  
 
One recent attempt to do so is Forging Peace, edited by Monroe Price and Mark Thompson.11  
The text offers many useful insights, notably with respect to legally grounded preventative 
and intervention measures, but its focus is actually quite limited. The questions it poses and 
the conclusions reached are indicative of most of the literature: how the ‘international 
community’ can use media policy to simultaneously promote ‘market democracy’ and 
peace.12 The assumption is that these projects are interlinked or even synonymous with one 
another.  But the majority of war and post-war situations do not involve international 
reconstruction efforts of significant energy and resources to warrant such emphasis. In 
violently disturbed zones in Africa, for example, market democracy is not likely to be a 
possibility for a long time. 
 
The Forging Peace approach nevertheless reflects the dominant liberal agendas of 
international organisations, most rich-country governments, and the main international news 
organisations that claim to be unified behind a policy of minimal media regulation. The 
World Bank has recently argued, in a book entitled The Right to Tell, that this will lead to 
economic development by increasing transparency.  Staff at the Bank would probably 
nowadays accept that a free and vibrant media, as with all liberal programmes, actually 
requires a relatively strong state including, for example, a well- functioning legal system to 
protect individuals against libel or racist abuse. Yet, when it comes to war zones, the 
‘received wisdom’ seems to be that the best way to counter divisive speech is to allow for 
more speech (so that multiple perspectives are available), rather than to impose restrictions. 
Along these lines, Ross Howard, Director of the Institute for Media Policy and Civil Society 
(IMPACS),13 argues that the media are an imperative component for ‘peace-building’ 
because: 
At its best, [the media] is the safeguard of democratic governance. At 
its best means accurate and balanced reporting which fairly represents 
a diversity of views sufficient for the public to make well- informed 
choices. Reliable and diverse media that can express themselves freely 
provide early warning of potential outbreaks of conflict. They serve as 
watchdogs over leaders and officials and hold them accountable. They 
monitor human rights. Their presence is essential to the functioning of 
other civil society actors. In less optimal environments, the media can 
                                                 
9 Jamie F. Metzl, ‘Information Intervention: when switching channels isn’t enough’, Foreign Affairs , 76:6 
(November/December 1997), pp.15-20.   
10 As Gadi Wolfsfeld notes: “ Why is there so much research about the role of news media in political conflict 
and war and so little concerning media and peace? … There is not one major study which has looked at the role 
of the news media in an ongoing peace process… Even the most casual observer cannot fail to be impressed with 
the ability of the news media to serve an either constructive or deconstructive role in the promotion of peace” 
(Gadi Wolfsfeld, ‘Promoting Peace through the News Media.  Some Initial Lessons from Oslo Peace Process’, in 
Tamar Liebes & James Curran (eds), Media Ritual and Identity, London: Routledge, 1998, p.219). 
11 Monroe Price & Mark Thompson (eds), Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of 
Media Space, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002 - a follow-up to Thompson’s Forging War (1994). 
12 Market democracy is a term that eludes exact definition but it evokes a combination of liberal economic 
policies with systems of accountable governance emphasising individual freedom, constraints on state power, 
human rights and some form of democracy.   
13 A Canadian charitable organization that can be found at http://www.impacs.org. 
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still foster stability by providing essential information about 
humanitarian initiatives.14 
 
As with so much of the literature, the starting point here is the benefits of the media at 
‘optimal performance’- i.e. in rich democracies.15 From the perspective of Iraq, Rwanda or 
Afghanistan, Howard’s comment about “less optimal environments” seems rather naïve.  In 
such places, the media may not be restrained by the kinds of institutionalised legal and other 
mechanisms available in the US or the UK.  Certainly the media can, and often do, have a 
much more significant impact than just providing “information about humanitarian 
initiatives” – one that is just as likely to be detrimental as positive.  The Rwandan 
government’s Milles Collines radio station was, after all, partly a product of an internationally 
supported peace and democratisation project.16  Yet, in almost all of Howard’s “less optimal 
environments”, proponents of free expression are deeply reluctant to concede situations where 
restricting the media may be appropriate except in the most blatant or dire of circumstances.  
 
In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, there has been discussion about the warning signs 
and signals that might provide enough evidence to warrant disruption of broadcasters or the 
shutting down of a printing press before violence breaks out or immediately after. But much 
discussion remains focused on opening the media and encouraging more voices to counteract 
the offender, thereby promoting a ‘marketplace of ideas’.17 Not only does censorship disrupt 
natural media competition but it encourages elites to exploit information flows in their own 
interests. As Index on Censorship stresses, limiting free expression would only leave room for 
the pointless grant of protection for the ideas or prejudices that those in power approve or do 
not fear.18 This line of argument has prompted several international donors to intervene in 
war-damaged places by funding opposition voices.  Some agencies, such as USAID, have 
been known to subsidise anti-government papers that are barely comprehendible for the sole 
reason they are anti-government or have encouraged ethnic-related media outlets to 
proliferate.  These policies are made with the idea that they will contribute to a variety of 
perspectives and thus promote understanding and peace.  
 
                                                 
14 Ross Howard, ‘An Operational Framework for Media and Peace building’, IMPACTS  (January 2002), p.4. 
15 Even in places where the media have the characteristics that Howard refers to, there are grounds for scepticism 
about his assertions. The news media in the US, for example, have sometimes been important in safeguarding 
democratic governance, but have also failed to do so on numerous occasions. At the time of writing, President 
Bush has won a second term in office, in spite of the fact that his administration has systematically provided 
misleading information about the situation in Iraq, and has manifestly violated human rights at the prison at 
Guantanamo Bay. It has been noted by several analysts that the US administrations are generally good at 
weathering press criticism, so long as a policy is maintained. After a while, the press moves on to another issue. 
The ‘CNN effect’ only seems to work when an administration’s policies are unclear or subject to change.  
16 The signing of the Arusha accords in 1993 enacted a power sharing agreement between the Hutus and Tutsis 
supervised by the United Nations. High on the agenda for the transition was the integration of the armies, the 
return of refugees and the development of free media, all of which would culminate in the 1995 multi-party 
elections.  
17 A term that goes back to a US court case of 1919 when Justice Holmes argued that ideas will compete against 
one another and that truth will prevail in this ‘marketplace’.  In the case (Abrahms vs. The United States), 
Holmes drew upon John Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859), and argued in 
his Abrahms dissent: “But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to 
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market ... . That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all 
life is an experiment”. 
18 See, for example, http://www.indexonline.org. 
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Not surprisingly, feelings run particularly high on the issue of media freedom amongst many 
journalists. But it is worth bearing in mind that like other actors in the peace industry 
journalists themselves are not immune to conflicts of interest.  After all, whatever the integrity 
of their staff, global media networks obviously have self-serving motives. Press freedom in 
poor countries is a market into which they can expand and increase the use of their services. 
US economist R. H. Coase, amongst others, has drawn attention to these kinds of ulterior 
motives. 
The press is, of course, the most stalwart defender of the doctrine of 
freedom of press, an act of public service to the performance of which 
it has been led, as it were, by an invisible hand. If we examine the 
actions and views of the press, they are consistent in only one respect: 
they are always consistent with the self- interest of the press.19 
 
Other conflicts of interest and disagreements about how to encourage press freedom help 
explain why current media policy in Iraq has ended up being so confused – as indicated by the 
closing down of the Al-Hawza newspaper against Simon Haselock’s advice.  On the one 
hand, the United States policy has been to create an environment in which multiple voices can 
be heard as an antidote to the Baathist regime’s propaganda, or perhaps more importantly as 
an indicator of democratic governance or respect for ‘human rights’.  It is for this reason that 
the US government has made so much capital out of the fact that there are now an estimated 
300 newspapers in Baghdad.  On the other hand, the US government has reacted aggressively 
to what it regards as inaccurate or inflammatory reporting.  There are, in addition, serious 
tensions between the occupying allies as to what is considered an appropriate strategy. The 
UK approach to developing a viable media is based upon its own experience with a state-
funded public broadcaster. Simon Haselock, describes this problem:  
In the US the notion of public broadcasting is synonymous with state 
and state broadcasting is synonymous with the sorts of things which 
used to happen in these centralist regimes. It is extremely difficult to 
get people to understand that what public broadcasting gives you is 
the ability to require a broadcaster not to be controlled but to deliver 
certain services and have the funding necessary to be able to do it.20  
 
Haselock has had to push for a public broadcasting mechanism in Iraq against US doubts.  In 
his view there was no choice.  
We could not build an information mechanism in Iraq, or Iraqis could 
not build an information mechanism in Iraq if they had to rely on the 
basis of a commercial investor. They may only, for instance, want to 
provide a service which targets a particular section of the community 
or a particular region of a community of where they are most likely to 
get advertising revenues.21 
However, like the Americans, the Iraqis have also found a state- funded yet editorially 
independent broadcasting instrument a difficult concept to grapple with.  Also the incoming 
Iraqi government is much more concerned about controlling and constraining the flow of 
news through a new Ministry of Information (which is headed by a former Baathist 
                                                 
19 R. H. Coase, ‘The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas’, The American Economic Review, 64:2 (May 
1974), p.386. 
20 Haselock (2004).  
21 Haselock (2004). 
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intelligence officer) than grappling with the complexities of establishing an effective public 
broadcaster.  
 
What has been happening in Iraq highlights the need to put the prevalent emphasis on press 
freedom and political openness into a context of what is actually going on, rather than linking 
it to an invocation of what would be ideal. Media freedom and responsibility in post war 
environments arise in what Roland Paris describes as an enormous experiment in social 
engineering that seeks to transplant specific economic, political and social models in war-
shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political 
and economic liberalisation. 22 Experience has shown that this is highly problematic. 
 
States emerging from violent conflict tend to lack institutional mechanisms for any kind of 
sudden transition to market democracy. Attempts to develop these institutions quickly during 
a peacekeeping mission by individuals and organisations that may not be entirely familiar 
with local dynamics can actually hinder attempts towards long-term peace. After political 
liberalisation, for example, Angola was struck by an increase in violence, while premature 
elections in Bosnia hindered reconciliation by reaffirming the separation of parties.23 
Similarly, critics of the UN mission in Cambodia have argued that economic liberalisation has 
promoted growing inequalities between the cities and countryside, while political 
liberalisation has exacerbated factionalism and has essentially encouraged the development of 
two separate but parallel governments fraught with tension. 24  Here (and as we are currently 
witnessing in Iraq and Afghanistan) the political concerns of external actors take precedence 
over the realities on the ground.  There is a strong desire by the rich countries that have been 
actively involved to have a ‘victory’ – be it by establishing a media environment with 300 
competing newspapers or facilitating elections in a short timeframe.   
 
Rwanda is perhaps the most extreme case and has quickly become the textbook example. A 
peace process was linked to one of the worst genocides of the twentieth century.  There is 
strong evidence that a drive towards political liberalisation with international support helped 
create the political environment which allowed the killing. In particular, Snyder and 
Ballentine have persuasively argued that the conflict was intensified by greater press freedom.  
Rapid liberalisation of the media was part of the Arusha peace accords.25 It immediately 
spawned numerous news media outlets, largely dominated by opposition voices. Highly 
inaccurate and overtly biased editorials became prevalent. As Gerard Prunier puts it: “A 
vibrant press had been born almost overnight – in terrible bad faith”. 26 The Hutu elite, already 
feeling threatened by the potential loss of power they were to face, did not take these 
developments lightly. One reaction were the radio broadcasts of the government’s Milles 
Collines.  
 
                                                 
22 Roland Paris, ‘Peace building and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, 22:2 
(Autumn 1997), p.56. 
23 Paris (1997). 
24 Paris (1997), p.65. 
25 In the Arusha accords in August of 1993, the ‘international community’ pushed forward a peace deal between 
the Rwandan government and the RPF.  Under the new UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda) the UN was sent in to monitor the ceasefire and oversee the political transition.  Canadian Genera l 
Romeo Dallaire, backed by then Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali, argued that at least 5,000 UN troops 
were required to keep the peace. The US in the wake of the debacle in Somalia argued for 500 troops, a 
compromise was reached with 2,500.  
26 Gerard Prunier, as quoted in Jack Snyder & Karen Ballentine, ‘Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas’, 
International Security, 21:2 (Autumn 1996), p.32. 
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In the wake of the genocide some international organisations, notably Human Rights Watch, 
continued to promote democratic accountability and take the position that a free media could 
have helped avoid the tragedy. Snyder and Ballentine argue that it was “precisely the threat of 
such accountability that provoked the slaughter”. 27  In retrospect, most now agree that it 
would have been appropriate to clamp down on the hate speech of Milles Collines. Even 
Reporters Sans Frontières has warned, in regards to Rwanda’s neighbour Burundi, that the 
error committed in Rwanda of applying the rule of laissez-faire in the name of the principle of 
liberty of the press must not be repeated.28   
 
In Burundi, a new law on freedom of information has been enacted, and neither the 
‘international community’ nor the government is restricting the hate speech that is presently 
being broadcast. Instead, they are relying on two radio stations based in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to provide alternative points of view. After what happened in Rwanda, 
once again relying on a marketplace of ideas in a precarious environment appears to some 
analysts as very risky. Such concerns are a reason why there have been initiatives by groups 
such as BBC Monitoring to establish systems to identify warning signs of impending 
violence, based on media content analysis. This inevitably has methodological limitations. 
The same kinds of extreme or misleading statements may be widely dismissed by one 
population as nonsense, but widely accepted by another as ‘facts’. It all depends on the 
specific political processes at work. Nonetheless, as we will discuss in the next section with 
reference to South Africa, media monitoring of this kind is surely a positive development. At 
the very least it may highlight circumstances that require closer investigation, and it makes it 
a little more difficult for strategically unimportant parts of the world to be simply ignored.  
 
Overall, there has yet to be a consensus on what should comprise best practice in peace-
building media policy. The ideal of press freedom continues to be promoted in a simplistic 
way, but on the ground there is a great deal of ‘hand-to-mouth’ improvisation and often there 
are manifestly contradictory strategies. There is as much evidence that internationally 
supported initiatives have exacerbated local circumstances as that that they have contributed 
to political stability. The record, in so far as one has been kept, is very mixed.  Old formulas, 
such as the US example or even the British public broadcasting model, may be largely 
irrelevant. At the very least, circumstances are very different from one country to another.   
 
 
The Media and State Reconstruction 
We now turn to situations in which international media-assistance interventions have been 
less overt or significant than in the instances mentioned above. We comment briefly on 
various developments in Ethiopia, Uganda and South Africa.29 In all three countries, efforts 
have been made to move beyond the simplistic free/unfree dichotomy of so much of the 
debate, and local governments have sought out alternative ways of conceptualising 
relationships between the media and state during complex transitions. In focussing on them 
we do not intend to suggest that they should become ‘ideal types’ to be emulated elsewhere, 
nor that they are the only countries grappling with these issues – we could have just as easily 
drawn on numerous other cases. They nevertheless raise important issues of broad 
                                                 
27 Snyder & Ballentine (1996), p.33. 
28 RSF, as quoted in Snyder & Ballentine (1996), p.33. 
29 We have chosen these three countries largely because of our own interests and experience.  We just as easily 
could have used many other cases, including Ghana where the media has been instrumental in shaping the 
political environment. 
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applicability, and should have a much more central part in discussions about the roles of 
media in peace building than is usually the case.  
 
Africa’s so-called ‘New Leaders’, notably President Museveni of Uganda, Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and President Kagami of Rwanda, have forcefully put forward an 
argument that they are pursuing a democratisation strategy that will minimize the potential for 
divisive violent conflict. Not surprisingly they have provoked a critical response from human 
rights organisations.  Human Rights Watch, for example, argues that Museveni’s development 
strategy, referred to as a ‘movement system’, is nothing more than “old wine in new 
bottles”. 30  Similarly the progressive federalist constitutional structure Meles has crafted in 
Ethiopia has been described by critics as the façade of an authoritarian and bureaucratic 
regime.31  
 
These leaders doubtless have their own ulterior motives; nevertheless their argument should 
be taken seriously.  Supporters, for example, have argued that the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has been relatively successful in holding the 
country together while also allowing space for the expression of ethnic diversity.  They 
commend the relative success of the current leadership, pointing out that there are few 
precedents to guide in the transformation of such a deeply traditional, authoritarian, 
underdeveloped and severely damaged country as rapidly as some suggest possible”.32 The 
case may be instructive, as it challenges us to re-think exactly what we mean by media 
development and what an appropriate trajectory might look like.  
 
The conflict between the Ethiopian state under Meles Zenawi and the Ethiopian press has 
sometimes been intense. Certainly the government is not above persecuting individual 
journalists and newspapers.  It has generally failed to cooperate with the independent media, 
normally excluding their journalists from official events – within the last ten years the private 
press has yet to be invited to one of Meles’s press conferences.  In 2000, Ethiopia had more 
imprisoned journalists than any other African country (an achievement that has subsequently 
been eclipsed by its neighbour Eritrea).  Reporters Sans Frontiers has claimed that Meles is a 
“predator of press freedom”. 33 In May of 2004, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Information released 
the latest and likely final version of a draft Proclamation to Provide for Freedom of the 
Press.34  Amnesty International, Article 19 and Human Rights Watch, along with both local 
and international journalists, have been deeply critical, arguing that it will further restrict the 
media and that it is indicative of a broader trend of deteriorating human rights conditions.35  
 
However, it is quite possible to put a more positive spin on what has occurred. It could be 
argued that Meles’s Ethiopia is pursuing a path of media development consistent with the 
                                                 
30 This argument is laid out in Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political 
Repression in Uganda , New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 
31 John W. Harbeson, ‘A Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regime’, Journal of Democracy, 9:4 (October 1998), p.65. 
32 Paul Henze, ‘A Political Success Story’, Journal of Democracy, 9:4 (October 1998), pp. 40-54. 
33 Reporters San Frontiers, Annual Report 2002 
www.rsf.org/mra/jul02/jul02_front2.htm 
34 Essentially, the draft proclamation is part of  an effort by the government to develop a regulatory framework 
that will concern itself not only with freedom of expression issues but freedom of information issues, making 
Ethiopia one of a handful of countries in Africa that have developed a legal framework for freedom of 
information.  The South African group Resolve has been contracted by the Ministry of Capacity Building to 
consult on how to draft and implement these laws while the Ministry of Information has been focusing on the 
draft press laws.   
35 See, for example, Article 19, Briefing Note on The Draft Ethiopian Proclamation to Provide for the Freedom 
of the Press, London: Article 19, 2004.  
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agenda proclaimed by the ‘New Leaders’.  His government has combined aggressive 
constraint procedures with provision of relatively considerable space for dissent. It is striking 
that the text of the recent Proclamation has not ignored inputs by various local organisations 
and journalists.  Many free-media activists think that the law is too restrictive, but they have 
to concede that some of their concerns have been taken into account, and in several instances 
they have seen changes addressing their points in the various drafts.  Moreover, despite 
Ethiopia’s low rating for press tolerance, there is a considerable amount of open discussion – 
some of it highly charged and vociferous. The government’s harsh attitude towards the 
independent media has been matched by an equally aggressive response.36  Indeed, the 
majority of Ethiopian newspapers make the indecencies of the UK’s tabloid press seem mild.  
Even the Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association has noted that alarmist and false 
reporting is very prevalent, as well as stories that lack sufficient evidence to substantiate their 
assertions.  For many of the papers, it would appear that their sole purpose has been to try to 
de-legitimise the government or to antagonise particular groups. While the effects of the 
Proclamation to Provide for Freedom of the Press has yet to be properly assessed, the debate 
the government has facilitated about media responsibilities and the limits to what is 
acceptable to say, may not be misplaced. It may indicate that things are less simple than has 
been asserted, and that this government is struggling to come to terms with a free media 
environment by trying to create a viable framework in which it can operate, without 
undermining the overarching agenda of re- invigorating the Ethiopian state. 
 
A particular aspect of Ethiopia’s Proclamation that has been criticised by organisations 
promoting press freedom is the clauses that mention the illegality of false accusations. Article 
19, in a briefing on the draft of the Proclamation, explained the basis of its reservations:  
ARTICLE 19 is opposed in principle to legal measures that prescribe 
the working methods of the media, or legal provisions requiring all 
news to be truthful. The media should be free to organise its internal 
working arrangements. Furthermore, goals of publications should not 
be prescribed, as this may be open to abuse on the grounds that a 
publication did not have these goals. Similarly, legal requirements 
requiring media to check the truthfulness of what they seek to publish 
are inappropriate. These matters are properly addressed in 
professional guidelines. In any event, it is well established that the 
nature of the newsgathering process means that the media may make 
mistakes.37 
 
Article 19 has expressed similar views with respect to developments in Uganda.  Here the 
organisation can claim some credit for influencing the February 2004 decision of the Uganda 
Supreme Court to declare that the offence of ‘publishing false news’ was incompatible with 
the right to freedom of expression. This relates to the court case between Charles Onyango-
Obbo and Andrew Mujini Mwenda versus The Attorney General of Uganda. The written 
comments on the case, submitted by Article 19, exemplify the prevailing ‘international’ 
approach to many of the issues we have been discussing.   
 
The Article 19 commentary opens by summarising the case in which two journalists were 
charged with publishing false news suggesting that late President Kabilia gave a large amount 
                                                 
36 In Ethiopia the print media (i.e. newspapers) is a mix of government and private.  The radio and television 
remains almost entirely controlled by the government.  
37 Article 19 (2004). 
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of gold to Uganda.  However, no comments are made about the specific details. Obviously the 
intention was not to address the particular case but rather use it as an opportunity to attack 
Section 50 of Uganda’s Penal Code. This states that “any person who publishes any false 
statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb 
the peace is guilty of a misdemeanour”. 38  No attempt is made to assess the local context in 
which this code might operate. Rather, Article 19 makes its argument on the basis of 
principle, asserting that the false news provision is inconsistent with international and 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and cannot be regarded as either 
‘reasonable’ or ‘justifiable’ restrictions as allowed in instances of speech that may be 
threatening. 39  The legal cases cited are all from outside the African continent from either 
Europe or America.  Indeed, the brief reads as though the author merely cut and pasted 
various segments from a report that may have initially been created for another purpose.  
 
The position put forward by Article 19 is an interesting example of an international 
organisation using local legal mechanisms to prevent an African government from 
constraining press freedom.  Doubtless many readers will think this was an entirely credible 
intervention.  It is probably the case that ‘false information’ laws are more likely to be 
exploited by governments than more specific provisions on incitement to violence, which 
most African governments have on their statute books.40  However, one immediate 
consequence of striking off section 50 of the Penal Code is that it removes a legal instrument 
through which the government of Uganda might try to contain hate speech.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, the case illustrates a ‘human rights’ strategy that is unable to adjust 
to the specific context in which it is operating.  As Jon Lunn has noted, there is a prevailing 
“international legal absolutism” evident among organisations such as Article 19.  Specific 
historical or political considerations, that might be required to address the particular local 
realities of countries in complex transitions, are subordinated to the “global justice agenda”.41  
It seems reasonable to ask whether this strategy is appropriate for countries whose primary 
goal is peace and state reconstruction. 
 
President Museveni of Uganda shares many of Meles’s perspectives on state reconstruction 
and political development; indeed he has probably been something of a model for Meles to 
emulate.  Ugandan journalists have not always had an easy time, and there is no doubt that 
some have faced outright persecution. Nevertheless, as in Ethiopia, the parameters within 
which various kinds of media have been allowed to develop have been greater than most 
Uganda watchers would have thought possible in the mid 1980s. Visitors to the country are 
often amazed at the dynamism and critical qualities of the county’s newspapers and radio 
stations. Not surprisingly, the independent newspapers are the more outspoken, but the 
                                                 
38 There is a following provision that the accused can offer defence by proving that he took measures “to verify 
the accuracy of such statement, rumour or report as to lead him reasonably to believe that it was true”. Article  19 
report, Onyango-Obbo and Mwenda vs. Uganda Attorney General. 
39 Their brief suggested that Section 50 of the Penal Code that states: “(1) Any person who publishes any false 
statement, rumor or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace is 
guilty of a misdemeanor  and (2) It shall be a defense to a charge under subsection (1) if the accused proves that, 
prior to publication, he took such measures to verify the accuracy of such statement, rumor or report as to lead 
him reasonably to believe that it was true” is in contradiction with Section 29 of the Ugandan Constitution 
stating: “(1) Every person shall have the right to- (a) freedom of speech and expression, which shall include 
freedom of the press and other media.” 
40 In Uganda, part of the Constitution states that “no person shall prejudice the fundamental or other human 
rights and freedoms of others or the public interest”.   
41 Jon Lunn, ‘The power of justice/justice as power: Observations on the trajectory of the international human 
rights movement’, unpublished paper, January 2003 (available on request from Jon Lunn at j.lunn@lse.ac.uk). 
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government-owned New Vision is no mere propaganda device.42 News media have been 
allowed to be openly hostile to government policies, and have frequently been able to take 
powerful individuals to task in much the same ways as journalists have done in post-transition 
South Africa. 
 
In South Africa, the use of news media by politicians has had almost the opposite effects to 
those that occurred in Rwanda.  The media was critical on details of government actions and 
policies – often very critical indeed – but was broadly supportive of the national reconciliation 
and state-building project. What has occurred in South Africa illustrates how a government’s 
media policies may clash with the ‘global justice’ movement, and be bitterly opposed by 
many journalists, yet contribute substantially to essential political processes. At the time of 
the transition from apartheid to democracy there was the distinct possibility of the country 
being engulfed by civil war and political turmoil. Astute use of the available news media 
resources helped stop this from happening. One decisive example occurred after Chris Hani, a 
charismatic black leader who was popular in the townships, was gunned down in his 
driveway. President Mandela appealed for calm through the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), pointing out that the woman who identified the perpetrators was a white 
Afrikaner woman. His action is widely assessed to have played a key role in diffusing a 
potentially explosive situation. 
 
The relationship between government and news media has not been an easy one, however.  
After coming to power the ANC attempted to influence the SABC for its own purposes, 
prompting fierce debate within the country as to what the relationship between the new 
government and the public broadcaster should be.  The SABC has had to fiercely defend its 
relative independence.  A particular arena of tension has been a consequence of the 
government’s determination to eradicate all forms of hate-speech, including subtle racial 
biases.  For obvious reasons there has been a determination to push this policy to the limit, 
and systematic efforts have been made to ensure that all established media organisations are 
accountable on the issue.  The South African Human Rights Commission even went so far as 
to subpoena editors of some of the most liberal and progressive newspapers, an action which 
was hugely controversial with journalists and human rights organisations. What ensued was a 
year-long investigation into identifying and defining racism in the media, and a great deal of 
debate about what should be done to prevent it.43   
 
At one level the inquiry failed, in that it was unable to carry out the task it assigned itself (i.e. 
identifying subtle racism), but it facilitated an important discussion across society.  It forced 
journalists and editors to step back and reflect upon the role they should play during the 
important transition period, and helped create a situation in which they became acutely aware 
of the unconscious ways in which they might be promoting counterproductive stereotypes. It 
has led to a considerable amount of unregulated self-censorship: there are many things now 
that just cannot be said. In the fragile circumstances of post-apartheid South Africa, this has 
surely been valuable – even if it has limited a journalist’s capacity to tell the truth as she or he 
sees it.  
 
                                                 
42 To give just a couple of examples from 1998: The New Vision reported embezzlement of monies intended for 
fuel “for military operations against Joseph Kony rebels in northern Uganda, and the diversion of supplies, 
including medicines from the army to the LRA rebels” (‘UPDF officer charged’, New Vision, 6 April 1998; 
‘Two Kony bodyguards held in Kampala’, New Vision, 11 April 1998). 
43 While the SAHRC is ‘independent’ of the government there are clear and strong links including between   
Barney Pityana, the former Chairperson of the SAHRC and the current leadership in the ANC. 
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It is also important to note that these pressures and constraints have not incapacitated the 
South African news media. Far from it, if anything it has increased their importance and made 
them more of a voice for the population as a whole than they ever were in the past. By and 
large, they have been vigorously outspoken, frequently launching exposés of politicians and 
sometimes even the government itself. Given the relative weakness of opposition parties in 
the country, the press has to a large extent taken on the role of holding the ANC to account. 
 
In this respect, it must be recognised that the post-apartheid media in South Africa were still 
operating in an established and recognised legal system – the broader structural institutions 
were in place to provide recourse when due. This marks a critical difference from many other 
countries. In short, there were courts to turn to if someone had to sue for libel, there was a 
judiciary that remained strong, and executive leadership that worked within the legal 
framework. There were, of course, also entrenched hierarchies associated with these broader 
structural institutions. The Human Rights Commission challenged some of these, but only up 
to a point. In general, the ANC government has sought to guarantee the rights and safety of 
political and economic elites. This has been very unpopular with many political activists, not 
only in South Africa itself; but it is the case that functioning state systems require such 
hierarchies.  As Mandela accepted, to change them overnight would have been catastrophic.  
Elsewhere, peace-building governments may not inherit similarly institutionalised social 
stratification.  Ideally, this could be avoided – but that is not the way things work. Effectively 
hierarchies have to be established as part of the state construction process.  This is one of the 
most difficult things for human rights organisations and development agencies to come to 
terms with, and lies behind much of the criticism levelled at the likes of Museveni and Meles. 
 
 
Conclusion: a case for media manipulation? 
As this chapter has argued, the current approach to media policy in countries emerging from 
violent conflict is problematic and needs to be re-thought.  Let us conclude by reviewing the 
arguments put forth and suggest a possible way forward.  
 
First, it is important to note the impact liberal ideology has had on ways in which media 
policy is constructed and the need to re-conceptualise the role of the state in media 
development.  In the 1960s, Samuel Huntington suggested that open institutions such as a free 
press were “luxuries” transitioning states could ill afford.  In short, he argued that the 
potential disruption of mass public participation was simply a risk that countries struggling to 
modernise need not take.44  Such ideas were always controversial, and were understandably 
seen as discredited by the militarised autocracies of the 1970s. The promise, however, of 
political and economic liberalisation has proved almost as fruitless in most parts of the world. 
As this chapter has illustrated, the prevailing approach to media development is indicative of 
the broader ideological liberal approach to political development and is thus vulnerable to 
similar criticisms.  Developing an open media environment, like other liberal projects, 
requires the presence of a strong state which includes, among other features, a well 
functioning legal and judicial environment. 
 
Second, the prevailing approach towards the media in transitioning countries is structured 
around the experience and impressions of rich countries rather than local realities. While 
almost everyone is beginning to accept that markets have to be regulated, and that state 
institutions have to be strong for them to work effectively, the need for checks and balances in 
                                                 
44 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, London: Yale University Press, 1968. 
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transitioning countries continues to be under-emphasised.  This is partly because a free media 
continues to be considered by many journalists and NGO’s as a human right. Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, is about individual and collective rights 
and liberties, not about the independence of media organisations.45  Additionally, there is a 
tendency in rich countries for domestic media environments to be seen as something of an 
ideal, exemplifying the population’s openness and freedoms.  As most readers are well aware, 
the reality is more complicated. Rich countries do not have perfectly competitive 
marketplaces of ideas.  While formal state censorship may be minimal, there are nevertheless 
mechanisms and codes of conduct that serve a similar role.  In the UK, for example, simply 
by looking at who owns newspapers and funds TV stations one can see that the media market 
is constrained.  Along a similar vein, many in the US media have made clear that they 
recognise their negligence and failure in the run-up to the war in Iraq when certain ideas that 
challenged the rational behind the war were not given a ‘fair’ and ‘equal’ voice. 
 
The third argument we have made is that the tendency of journalists and human rights 
organisations to ignore the local realities and rather push their own ‘international justice’ 
agenda may be counter productive.  While the media and human rights organisations have 
effectively lobbied, particularly in weaker states, against the use of state constraint they have 
similarly divorced issues of media liberalisation from the political context.  Given the 
asymmetrical power relations between large human rights organisations with substantial 
lobbying power in rich countries, and poorer countries with leadership that is regarded as 
weak and semi-autocratic at best, it is easy to see how local initiatives or arguments for 
slower media liberalisation fall on deaf ears.  Thus, foreign ‘experts’, often in line with rich 
countries, are increasingly defining and dominating processes such as ‘truth’ and ‘justice’.  As 
John Lunn describes, this approach is unfortunately something we are all familiar with: 
During the colonia l period, Africans (and other colonised) were often 
viewed as children who were not ready yet for self-government.  In 
the modern world, a similar characterisation is creeping back in.  
Locals are seen as lacking the capacity or maturity to govern 
themselves.  ... new forms of trusteeship are justified on the basis that 
reactionary and opportunistic local political leaders cannot be trusted 
to rule justly and fairly.46   
Given the complexity of political transitions and state reconstruction it would be unfortunate 
if viable local alternatives were not explored or tolerated because they may possibly 
contradict some of the expectations or standards of rich countries.  As we described in this 
chapter, the controversial approach taken by Africa’s ‘New Leaders’ may present one of these 
alternative strategies.  Accepting such approaches, however, will necessitate some degree of 
systematic assessment on the nature and intentions of the current government. While such 
analysis is often difficult, it does clearly warrant further exploration and study. 
 
                                                 
45The text of Article 19 is as follows: “Everyone has the right to the freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. We do note, however, that some of the world’s most 
progressive constitutions, such as South Africa, have provisions for providing for the right to an open media.  In 
addition, as certain norms have been accepted as ‘standards’, we recognise that this may be contested terrain, 
however, and conflating one with the other can be profoundly misleading. It may well be that there are good 
reasons for a government to want to control media organisations and to put limits on what they can say and how 
it can be said in order to protect the human rights of their citizens including their right to development.  
46 Lunn (2003). 
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Fourth, whatever the rhetoric about promoting freedom of expression, the situation on the 
ground is often muddled, contradictory and sometimes hypocritical. In places like Iraq this 
has been at least partly because US and other occupying troops from rich countries are 
themselves vulnerable to attack and have thus been inclined to shut down media outlets . But 
more generally, concerns about hate speech are supplanted in initiatives to create a space for 
promoting news manipulation, ideally without enforcement procedures or explicit controls. In 
many respects this is, of course, how news media in particular is effectively restrained in rich 
countries, including the UK and US. Also in Iraq and other war zones, while some 
international organisations are promoting multiple voices and freedom of speech, others are 
experimenting with mechanisms to manipulate the marketplace of ideas including efforts to 
promote peace by funding particular media outlets.  This kind of ‘peace media’ approach has 
become popular with some donor agencies, such as Oxfam, and also with some large media 
organisations, such as the BBC. The intention is to make the content of the programmes more 
interesting and just generally better than the alternatives available. Results have so far been 
mixed, but such experiments are interesting and clearly have possibilities for development.47   
While peace media is certainly an important initiative that is gaining momentum and 
popularity, the general approach to media deve lopment continues to be dominated by the ‘one 
size fits all’ laissez faire project.  As this strategy is not likely to be entirely abandoned, there 
is, however, the potential for slowing it down and concentrating on rebuilding institutions.  
Doing so would also suggest greater understanding from rich countries of the challenges 
faced by transitioning governments.  It would also reduce charges of hypocrisy – such as 
those that emerged from Iraq – as it would demonstrate that it is not only rich countries that 
can be trusted to impose censorship and shape developing media environments.  
 
Fifth, in instances when more institutionalised mechanisms that may exist in rich countries 
are either not present or functioning properly, explicit constraint may be required.  When this 
is necessary, a crucial issue is by whom?  Just as developing countries have successfully 
argued at the WTO that they are willing to buy into liberal market economics but they want 
concessions and safeguards – there are parallel lessons for the media as well. But giving the 
state too much control may also be a risky proposition as a long line of African autocrats has 
clearly taught.  An alternative strategy will clearly require some degree of international or 
regional oversight as well as greater transparency and accountability. 
 
One possibility is the establishment of a United Nations global media watchdog that could 
serve as a central component to ensure standards and procedures are adhered to and to prevent 
abuse. Monitoring, however, must be done according to certain accepted principles and 
undertaken in such a way that is not seen as simply reflecting the values and interests of the 
world’s rich states.  The proliferation of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) offers 
a possible analogy for establishing a media oversight body with both local and international 
credentials.  In Sierra Leone, for example, the TRC is a hybrid of local and international 
jurists.  Independent Media Commissions might adopt this hybrid structure thus allowing for 
the participation of both local and international media bodies.  These Commissions would 
                                                 
47 Oxfam-Quebec, for example, has sponsored a very successful peace programme in Somalia – Radio Galkayo.  
This programme tackles a variety of issues such as de-mining, concerns of women and peace and reconciliation.  
It is produced by some young journalists in the area and has been successful at spearheading community projects 
that have brought together various factions.  Not all attempts at peace media are successful, and a recent attempt 
in Somalia by BBC Trust is indicative of just how problematic it may be.  The BBC Somali service hosted a 
drama series to discuss conflict resolution.  They however made a grievous error in selecting the choice of 
actors, and one clan regarded the drama as a plot by another clan to attack them (Gordan Adam & Lina Holguin, 
‘The Media’s Role in Peace building: Asset or Liability?’, Our Media 3 Conference, Barranquilla, Columbia 
(19-23 May 2003), p.10). 
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also serve as an important mechanism for facilitating local dialogue about past media abuses 
as well as discussions about responsible peace-building reporting. 
 
In the case of Africa, another option may be found within the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM),48 a central component of Africa’s new development initiative – the 
New Partnership for African Development (NePAD).49 Everyone would feel more 
comfortable with limitations on media freedoms if states had to request permission to impose 
them.  Perhaps a system could be established similar to how law enforcement officers must 
request a search warrant from a court.  For example, if states subscribed to the APRM and 
agreed to be held accountable to prevent abuse, in return they would be allowed greater scope 
for restricting the media during precarious transitions and more time in which to develop the 
infrastructure for a free media.   
 
These initiatives, however, will require further re-evaluation of the overall peace building 
agenda as well as some degree of compromise from the NGOs and human rights advocates 
that so passionately hold to their own perspective. While it is premature to propose a new 
approach to media in peace-building environments, we hope this paper has succeeded in 
questioning the underlying assumptions of the liberal approach.  There is much research to be 
had in continuing to sketch out alternative frameworks for thinking about the media’s role in 
transitions. It is our hope that future initiatives will be characterised by a greater focus on 
holding local strategies to account rather than the continued imposition of rich country 
strategies.  
                                                 
48 The APRM is an instrument that is used for self-monitoring by the participating countries.  Both Uganda and 
Ethiopia are currently on the fifteen-member steering committee.  Countries that have agreed to join the APRM 
submit to periodical peer reviews whose primary purpose is to foster the adoption of certain policies, standards 
and practices with the intention of achieving political stability and cooperation.   For more information visit the 
African Union’s website or the reports from the 2002 meeting where the APRM was established.  See, for 
example, http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/aprm.htm. 
49 For more information on NePAD, see the official website at http://www.nepad.org. 
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